

ARBAC Policy for a Large Multi-National Bank

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Abstract

Administrative role-based access control (ARBAC) is the first comprehensive administrative model proposed for role-based access control (RBAC). ARBAC has several features for designing highly expressive policies, but current work has not highlighted the utility of these expressive policies. In this report, we present a case study of designing an ARBAC policy for a bank comprising 18 branches. Using this case study we provide an assessment about the features of ARBAC that are likely to be used in realistic policies.

1 Introduction

This case study describes the design of an administrative role-based access-control (ARBAC) policy for a bank comprising 18 branches. We designed the ARBAC policy to meet the following two goals:

1. Facilitate the business functions in each branch by appropriately provisioning roles to facilitate the tasks of each job position.
2. Enforce a separation of privilege (SOP) property to prevent collusive behavior in the execution of important job tasks.

The business functions and job roles used in each bank branch are based on an existing study. Schadd et al. [3] describes a role-based access-control (RBAC) policy for an European bank branch. We extend this policy into an ARBAC policy in two steps. First, we add 17 additional branches with the same functions and job roles. This is because we limited our case study to 18 branches, which is approximately 600 roles based on the number of roles in each branch. Second, we designed *can_assign* and *can_revoke* rules for administering role assignment actions such that the SOP property is enforced.

SOP is a key concern for financial institutions because they are required to enforce such properties either by regulators or to be compliant with standards such as ISO 9000 [2]. SOP has its primary objective in the prevention of fraud or collusive behavior in crucial operations. Typically, SOP is enforced by dividing tasks and privileges for executing an operation among multiple users, and making sure that a single user cannot obtain all the privileges necessary for independently completing an operation.

For example, let us consider that the *Widget* corporation wants to enforce a high level of transparency in the processing of purchase orders. To meet this objective, *Widget* splits the purchase order transaction into two tasks, namely creation and approval. The permissions for the tasks are assigned such that junior level employees have the ability to create purchase orders, but only the division's manager can approve the purchase orders. Formally, the SOP constraint for this example can be stated as, $\langle \{ \text{Creation, Approval} \}, 1 \rangle$, which means that a user can at most have one role from the set $\{ \text{Creation, Approval} \}$.

This case study illustrates how SOP constraints can be enforced by using a well designed ARBAC policy. Three features of ARBAC, namely *disjunctions*, *positive preconditions*, and *mixed roles*, are useful in expressing the SOP constraints. This case study illustrates how these features are used in the policy. These features are complexity sources with respect to analyzing these policies for safety. Therefore, use of these features makes the automatic analysis of ARBAC policies harder. However, because of the utility of these features in enforcing properties such as SOP, we envision that realistic policies will take advantage of these features.

This case study also describes how to formulate safety queries for verifying properties of the policy. Formally, a safety query is a tuple of the form $\langle u, r \rangle$ that questions whether a user u can be assigned to a role r . Several questions about the policy can be formulated as one or more safety queries [1,4]. We illustrate this with examples of safety queries for verifying the SOP property. Model checkers could be used for verifying these safety questions prior to deploying the policy.

The remainder of this case study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the roles and the role hierarchy in the policy. Section 3 describes the design of the *can_assign* and *can_revoke* rules. Section 4 describes how to formulate analysis questions. Section 5 provides a summary.

2 Roles and Role Hierarchy

The bank comprises 18 branches. Each branch in the bank has 33 roles that are spread over four business divisions, namely financial analyst (FA), share technician (ST), office banking (OB), and support e-commerce (SE). Table 1 contains the list of roles in each branch and Figure 1 contains the role hierarchy. There are eight roles per business division, comprising the following:

1. A role for each business division from which all the other roles in the business division inherit. For example, all the roles in the FA business division inherit from the FA role.
2. Two managerial roles. For example, FA-HOD and FA-GM are managerial roles in the FA division.
3. Five non-managerial roles. For example, FA-Asst, FA-Specialist, FA-Senior, FA-Junior, and FA-Clerk are non-managerial positions in the FA division.

Each branch has a role called employee, from which all other branch-specific roles inherit. Each branch has the same set of roles, leading to 594 roles in the bank policy comprising 18 branches.

In each branch, the five non-managerial roles in each business division have a separation of privilege constraint such that a user may not be assigned to more than 3 roles of the five roles. For example, FA-Asst, FA-Specialist, FA-Senior, FA-Junior, and FA Clerk are the five junior roles in the FA division. A user who is already assigned to one of these roles can be additionally assigned to at most 2 roles out of the remainder four roles.

Our policy assumes separate administration, which implies that administrative roles are not managed by the same set of rules that apply to the regular roles. We have a single role named *Ad-*

	Function	Position	Role
1.	Financial Analyst	Head of Division	FA-HOD
2.	Financial Analyst	Group Manager	FA-GM
3.	Financial Analyst	Specialist	FA-Special
4.	Financial Analyst	Assistant	FA-Asst
5.	Financial Analyst	Senior	FA-Senior
6.	Financial Analyst	Junior	FA-Junior
7.	Financial Analyst	Clerk	FA-Clerk
8.	Share Technician	Head of Division	ST-HOD
9.	Share Technician	Group Manager	ST-GM
10.	Share Technician	Specialist	ST-Special
11.	Share Technician	Assistant	ST-Asst
12.	Share Technician	Senior	ST-Senior
13.	Share Technician	Junior	ST-Junior
14.	Share Technician	Clerk	ST-Clerk
15.	Office Banking	Head of Division	OB-HOD
16.	Office Banking	Group Manager	OB-GM
17.	Office Banking	Specialist	OB-Special
18.	Office Banking	Assistant	OB-Asst
19.	Office Banking	Senior	OB-Sr
20.	Office Banking	Junior	OB-Jr
21.	Office Banking	Clerk	OB-Clerk
22.	Support E-Comm	Head of Division	SE-HOD
23.	Support E-Comm	Group Manager	SE-GM
24.	Support E-Comm	Specialist	SE-Special
25.	Support E-Comm	Assistant	SE-Asst
26.	Support E-Comm	Senior	SE-Sr
27.	Support E-Comm	Junior	SE-Jr
28.	Support E-Comm	Clerk	SE-Clerk
29.	Financial Analyst	-	FA
30.	Share Technician	-	ST
31.	Office Banking	-	OB
32.	Support E-Comm	-	SE
33.	Branch Employee	-	Employee

Table 1: Roles Derived from Function and Official Positions




Figure 1: Role Hierarchy Design

min used for administering role assignments and revocations. Therefore, the *Admin* role appears as a precondition in all the assignment and revocation rules.

3 Can_Assign and Can_Revoke Rules

We designed *can_assign* rules to enforce the constraint that a user can be assigned to at most 3 roles out of the five non-managerial roles in each business division. This constraint can be stated formally as,

$$\langle \{FA-Asst, FA-Specialist, FA-Senior, FA-Junior, FA Clerk\}, 3 \rangle$$

The *can_assign* rules are designed to express the valid conditions for assigning a user to a particular role. The conditions specify the role memberships that are required for user to be assigned to a role. To meet our SOP objective, we need to enumerate all the valid conditions that can entitle a user to be assigned to each of the five non-managerial role. These conditions can then be expressed as one or more *can_assign* rules.

We illustrate the design of the *can_assign* rules using an example. For example, let us consider the FA-Clerk role. Table 2 contains the *can_assign* rules for the role FA-Clerk. A user can be assigned to the role FA-Clerk, under three cases:

1. *Case 1:* If a user is not assigned to any other managerial role, then he can be assigned to the FA-Clerk role. To express this condition, we created a *can_assign* rule that contains FA as a positive precondition and four negative preconditions for the other four non-managerial roles.
2. *Case 2:* If a user is already assigned to a single non-managerial role, then the user may be assigned to an additional non-managerial role. To express this condition, we need four *can_assign* rules. Each of these four rules will have 2 positive preconditions and 3 negative

	Admin Role	Preconditions	Target Role
1.	Admin	$FA \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Asst \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Specialist \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Senior \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Junior$	FA-Clerk
2.	Admin	$FA \wedge FA\text{-}Asst \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Specialist \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Senior \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Junior$	FA-Clerk
3.	Admin	$FA \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Asst \wedge FA\text{-}Specialist \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Senior \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Junior$	FA-Clerk
4.	Admin	$FA \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Asst \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Specialist \wedge FA\text{-}Senior \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Junior$	FA-Clerk
5.	Admin	$FA \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Asst \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Specialist \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Senior \wedge FA\text{-}Junior$	FA-Clerk
6.	Admin	$FA \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Asst \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Specialist \wedge FA\text{-}Senior \wedge FA\text{-}Junior$	FA-Clerk
7.	Admin	$FA \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Asst \wedge FA\text{-}Specialist \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Senior \wedge FA\text{-}Junior$	FA-Clerk
8.	Admin	$FA \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Asst \wedge FA\text{-}Specialist \wedge FA\text{-}Senior \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Junior$	FA-Clerk
9.	Admin	$FA \wedge FA\text{-}Asst \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Specialist \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Senior \wedge FA\text{-}Junior$	FA-Clerk
10.	Admin	$FA \wedge FA\text{-}Asst \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Specialist \wedge FA\text{-}Senior \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Junior$	FA-Clerk
11.	Admin	$FA \wedge FA\text{-}Asst \wedge FA\text{-}Specialist \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Senior \wedge \neg FA\text{-}Junior$	FA-Clerk

Table 2: Can_Assign rules for FA-Clerk Roles

preconditions. Of the two positive preconditions, one is for a business division role FA and the other is one of the four non-managerial roles. The remainder non-managerial roles appear as negative preconditions.

3. *Case 3*: If a user is already assigned to two non-managerial roles, then the user can be assigned to an additional non-managerial role. To express this condition, we need six *can_assign* rules. Each of the six rules have 3 positive preconditions and 2 negative preconditions. The 3 positive preconditions include the business division role and two of the four non-managerial roles. The remainder non-managerial roles appear as negative preconditions.

As illustrated by Table 2, the *can_assign* rules make use of disjunctions, positive preconditions, and mixed roles. The valid conditions for assigning the FA-Clerk role is essentially a disjunction, in which each *can_assign* rule is a disjunct. Also, several of the *can_assign* rules have mixed preconditions because they have both positive and negative preconditions.

We followed the same procedure for designing the *can_assign* rules for all the other non-managerial roles. The complete list of the *can_assign* and *can_revoke* rules can be obtained from our policy file¹.

The *can_assign* rules for the managerial roles were designed to enforce that a user assigned to any of the non-managerial roles cannot be assigned to a managerial role. Therefore, assignment rules for the managerial roles had negative preconditions for all the non-managerial roles and one positive precondition for the business division role.

In our policy, all the roles are revocable. Therefore, we had 594 *can_revoke* rules, one for each role. We did not see any reason to make a branch-specific role irrevocable.

4 Analysis Questions

As mentioned earlier, several questions about the policy can be expressed as a safety query. We illustrate how the following two analysis questions can be expressed as a safety query:

1. Can a user be assigned to four non-managerial roles in a business division in any of the 18 branches?
2. Can a user be assigned to four non-managerial roles in a business division in all the 18 branches?

¹<http://kjayaram.mysite.syr.edu/mohawk/Mohawk.html>

Both these questions can be encoded as a safety question of the form $\langle u, targetrole \rangle$ as follows.

To express these analysis questions as safety queries, we need to add some additional roles, *can_assign*, and *can_revoke* roles. These additions do not affect the valid administrative actions for the other roles described in the policy.

For each branch, we add two additional roles, i.e., we add roles *AnyFour_i* and *Branch_i* for each branch. The objective of the *AnyFour_i* is to identify if a user can be assigned to four non-managerial roles. We add *can_assign* rules for this role in each branch to express the condition that if a user is a member of four non-managerial roles, then he may be assigned to this special role. The *Branch_i* roles help in the encoding of both safety questions, so we will refer to them as helper roles. The *can_assign* rules for each of the helper roles express the condition that if a user can be assigned to either *AnyFour_i* or *Branch_(i+1)*, then he may be assigned to *Branch_i*.

To express question (1) as a safety question, we add a single *can_assign* rule for *targetrole* that is of the form $\langle Admin, branch_1, targetrole \rangle$. The consequence of this rule is that If a user can be assigned to *targetrole*, then it implies that a user can be assigned to four non-managerial roles in at least one of the 18 branches.

To express question (2) as a safety question, we add a single *can_assign* rule for *targetrole* that is of the form $\langle Admin, branch_1 \wedge .. \wedge branch_{18}, targetrole \rangle$. The consequence of this rule is that if a user can be assigned to *targetrole*, then it implies that a user can be assigned to four non-managerial roles in all the branches.

5 Summary

We illustrated the design of an ARBAC policy with the intent of enforcing separation of privilege for a bank comprising 18 branches. The separation of privilege constraint that we have used is emblematic of realistic concerns. Disjunctions, positive preconditions, and mixed roles are very useful for encoding SOP constraints. The SOP constraints can be verified by designing safety queries.

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